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Abstract 
For Germany, our study estimates average effects of further vocational training, 
short training and job creation schemes on the employment prospects of partici-
pants. We compare participation in each programme with non-participation as well 
as with participation in one of the other programmes. Outcome variables are cumu-
lated days spent in regular employment during the 3.5 years after programme start 
as well as the share in regular employment at the end of the observation period. 
First, our results show rather favourable effects of participation in further vocational 
training programmes and in short firm-internal training – but not of participation in 
job creation schemes – on the employment prospects of participants. Second, as a 
result of shorter lock-in effects, shorter programmes perform mostly better when 
estimating programme effects on days in cumulated employment. However, regard-
ing shares in regular employment at the end of the observation period, in particular 
long retraining shows positive effects compared to shorter programmes. 
 
Wir untersuchen die Wirkung im März 2003 begonnener Weiterbildungs-, Trainings- 
und Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen auf die Arbeitsmarktchancen der Geförderten. 
Hierzu werden die jeweiligen Teilnehmer sowohl mit einer ähnlichen Gruppe nicht 
geförderter Personen als auch mit ähnlichen Teilnehmern an anderen Maßnahmen 
verglichen. Der Beobachtungszeitraum umfasst 3,5 Jahre nach Förderbeginn; Er-
gebnisvariablen sind die kumulierten Tage in ungeförderter Beschäftigung in diesem 
Zeitraum sowie der Anteil in ungeförderter Beschäftigung am Ende des Zeitraums. 
Die Befunde weisen zunächst darauf hin, dass die Teilnahme an Weiterbildungs- 
und Trainingsmaßnahmen – nicht aber an Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen – posi-
tive Effekte auf die Beschäftigungschancen der Geförderten hat. Der Programmver-
gleich zeigt: Wird der Effekt auf die kumulierten Tage in Beschäftigung untersucht, 
schneiden kürzere Programme im Vergleich zu längeren Maßnahmen besser ab – 
dies folgt vor allem aus den geringeren Einbindungseffekten. Allerdings haben 
mehrjährige Umschulungsmaßnahmen am Ende des Beobachtungszeitraums eine 
besonders positive Wirkung auf den Anteil in ungeförderter Beschäftigung. 
 
JEL classification: J68, J64, J65 
 
Keywords: Evaluation of active labour market programmes, further vocational train-
ing, short training programmes, job creation schemes, propensity score matching. 
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1 Introduction 
During the last years, the evaluation of active labour market programmes has be-
come a central research topic in Germany. On the one hand, politics and administra-
tion have increasingly been interested in topics as programme effectiveness and 
efficiency. On the other hand, the development of comprehensive merged data sets 
– covering times of unemployment, programme participation and employment – laid 
the groundwork for further research. Although methodological advancements (Im-
bens 1999, Lechner 2001) have extended the often used framework for the estima-
tion of causal treatment effects (Rubin 1974, Heckman et al. 1999) to pairwise pro-
gramme comparisons, most evaluation studies have analysed the effects of being or 
not being in a particular programme. Thus for Germany, the knowledge on “com-
parative effectiveness” of participation in different programmes is still sparse. Fur-
thermore, two recent studies using a comparative approach (Biewen et al. 2007, 
Wunsch/Lechner 2008), with the main focus on further vocational training pro-
grammes and short training-programmes, obtain partly different results. 
Our study adds some further insights to the literature on active labour market pro-
grammes. For Germany, we conduct a pairwise comparison of participation in differ-
ent variants of further vocational training, short-training programmes and job crea-
tion schemes. For the selected programme types we estimate average treatment 
effects of taking up a programme in March 2003 on the subsequent employment 
prospects of participants, compared to no programme entry as well as taking-up 
another of these programmes during March 2003. We follow participants and com-
parison group over 3.5 years and compute the cumulated effects on days spent in 
regular employment and the effect on shares in regular employment during this time 
interval. Average programme effects on participants are estimated by comparing the 
group of those joining a particular programme with a group of similar persons that 
did not enter this programme in March 2003. To choose adequate comparison 
groups we apply propensity score matching. The data used are provided by the 
TrEffeR-database of the German Public Employment Service.  
The next section provides a brief survey on the programmes investigated and 
sketches previous research results. Section 3 describes the evaluation approach 
and the applied method while Section 4 informs about data and variables used in 
the empirical analysis. Our empirical results are depicted in section 5. We draw 
some conclusions in Section 6. 
2 Programme features and literature review 
Unemployment in Germany had been rising for long years. As a consequence, ma-
jor labour market reforms were enacted from 2003 to 2005. New instruments of ac-
tive labour market policy were implemented, existing programmes were modified, 
the German Public Employment Service was reorganised, and former unemploy-
ment assistance and social assistance were consolidated into a new means-tested 
basic social care for needy unemployed job-seekers. Unemployment reached its 
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maximum with on average 4.9 million unemployed persons in 2005. Since 2005 un-
employment has been decreasing, down to (seasonally adjusted) 3.3 million regis-
tered unemployed in June 2008.  
Active labour market programmes have the main objective to avoid or shorten peri-
ods of unemployment. Table 1 gives an overview on entries and the number of indi-
viduals in the most important German labour market programmes from 2000 to 2006 
(see Bernhard et al. 2008 for details). Caseworkers have discretion in granting the 
majority of programmes (exceptions are start-up subsidies and – under certain con-
ditions – access to the services of a private placement agency). Our analysis is re-
stricted to three of the largest programmes: We analyse variants of further voca-
tional training, short training programmes and job creation schemes. Programme 
features as well as evaluation results will be described in the following. Further im-
portant programmes are in particular wage subsidies, start-up subsidies and con-
tracting-out to private agencies.  
Table 1 
Entries and average numbers in selected labour market programmes during 
2000-2006 (in 1000) 
  2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006
Entries into programme              
Further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung) 523 442 455 255 185 132 247
Job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungs-/Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen) 318 246 215 179 161 80 80
Job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten) - - - - - 630 742
Short training (Trainingsmaßnahmen) 485 551 865 1064 1188 894 978
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschuss) 152 127 188 183 157 134 217
Start-up subsidy I (Überbrückungsgeld) 93 96 125 159 183 157 108
Start-up subsidy II (Existenzgründungszuschuss) - - - 95 168 91 43
Start-up subsidy III (Gründungszuschuss) - - - - - - 34
Contracting-out to private agencies (Beauftragung privater Dritter)* - - - - 635 426 301
Average number in programme           
Further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung) 343 352 340 260 184 114 119
Job creation I (Arbeitsbeschaffungs-/Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen) 266 237 193 144 117 61 50
Job creation II (Arbeitsgelegenheiten) - - - - - 201 293
Short training (Trainingsmaßnahmen) 105 118 136 153 110 60 82
Wage subsidy (Eingliederungszuschuss) 52 60 74 93 95 69 70
Start-up subsidy I (Überbrückungsgeld) 43 46 56 73 84 83 63
Start-up subsidy II (Existenzgründungszuschuss) - - - 40 151 234 210
Start-up subsidy III (Gründungszuschuss) - - - - - - 8
Contracting-out to private agencies (Beauftragung privater Dritter)* - - - - 95 103 100
*)  Numbers are available since 2004, while different variants started already in 1998 (contracting-out subtasks 
of placement) and 2002 (contracting-out all placement services). 
Source: Statistics Department of the German Public Employment Service (Data-Warehouse). 
 
Programme features 
For a long time further vocational training (Förderung beruflicher Weiterbildung) has 
been one of the most important German labour market programmes. During the first 
half of this decade entries as well as the duration of these measures were shrinking; 
but the number of entries increased again in 2006. Further vocational training main-
tains, updates and extends professional qualifications and can thus be regarded as 
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a human capital investment. It encompasses a range of different treatments, which 
can be broadly classified in qualification programmes, training within “practice firms” 
(which offer practical occupational training, but are no “real” companies) and long 
retraining programmes. The latter might be granted to employees without completed 
vocational training or those who did not practice a corresponding job for the last four 
years might participate in a long retraining programme to obtain a degree. The direct 
training costs for further vocational training programmes are paid by the Public Em-
ployment Service. Furthermore, participants receive a subsistence allowance which 
usually equals unemployment compensation. Since 2003 access to further training 
programmes is granted through vouchers; issuing a training voucher to an unem-
ployed person is in the discretion of the caseworker. Vouchers specify the training 
target, programme duration, the regional scope and the period of validity (up to three 
months).  
Since 2001, short training programmes (Trainingsmaßnahmen) are the programme 
with the highest number of programme entries. Programme duration is, however, 
short and varies from two to eight weeks. Short training programmes have a number 
of different objectives (Kurtz 2003): They could improve knowledge and skills, test 
the occupational aptitude of the employee, check whether unemployed are suited 
for further longer-term measures, support job-search by job application training, or 
verify an employee's availability and willingness to work. Training measures are 
conducted by providers (classroom) or placement in a firm (firm-internal). Our analy-
sis is restricted to classroom and firm-internal short training programmes improving 
knowledge and skills. Similar to further vocational training programmes, direct pro-
gramme costs are paid by the Public Employment Service. Furthermore, participants 
in short training programmes continue to receive unemployment compensation. 
In Germany, job creation programmes have been used widely in the past, but nearly 
disappeared until 2004. Since 2005, a new variant of job creation schemes for the 
new group of needy job seekers receiving basic social care (Arbeitsgelegenheiten or 
Ein-Euro-Jobs) plays a major role; this programme provides mostly only a modest 
additional reimbursement for work. Our analysis will focus on the most important 
traditional variant: Job creation schemes (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahmen) are 
conducted by providers. They might be supported if they reduce further unemploy-
ment and maintain or to improve employability of the participants. The tasks carried 
out during participation also have to be of “additional” nature and of public interest. 
Until 2004, grants paid for job creation schemes were based upon an “allowable” 
remuneration and covered part of the costs. Currently a lump sum payment is 
granted, whose amount varies with the qualification required. The regular duration of 
participation in a job creation schemes is limited to 12 months, while exemptions are 
possible. A further variant (Strukturanpassungsmaßnahmen) has been in place from 
2003 to 2004, with the purpose to maintain or improve regional infrastructure and 
environment. Providers received a monthly lump sum payment for participants. The 
regular programme duration was 36 months, but could even be prolonged.  
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Selection into these programmes follows different mechanisms: Participation in fur-
ther vocational training programmes requires that the caseworker issues a training 
voucher to a potential participant, who has than to find a training provider offering an 
adequate course. Furthermore, the provider must be willing to sign in the inhabitant 
of the voucher. Kruppe (2008) shows that hard-to-place unemployed a) receive less 
often a voucher and b) less often make use of the voucher. Access to short firm-
external training programmes will be mostly “prescribed” by the caseworker. In con-
trast, short firm-internal training programmes takes place only if the caseworker as-
signs an unemployed person to the training and if a firm is willing to offer the training 
opportunity to potential participants. Employers might use the training to test the 
productivity of the unemployed person without incurring any wage costs. Thus short 
firm-internal training programmes might be seen as a kind of wage subsidy scheme. 
This raises also the danger of deadweight losses if an employer would have hired 
the unemployed in question anyway. Finally, participation in a job creation scheme 
requires consent of the caseworker, the unemployed person and the provider of the 
scheme. 
Recent evaluation results 
A considerable number of papers investigate the effectiveness of further vocational 
training programmes in Germany, comparing participants with comparable non-
participants. For further vocational training, Lechner et al. (2005, 2007), Fitzenber-
ger et al. (2006) and Fitzenberger/Völter (2007) analysed long-run effects up to 
seven years after programme entry, focusing mainly on unemployment entries dur-
ing 1993/94. In the long run, they generally found positive effects of further voca-
tional training. However, since programme effects are rather weak, it may take some 
time until the estimated effect turns positive. More recent programme entries into 
further vocational training – during the years 2000 to 2002 – have been investigated 
by Biewen et al. (2007), Kluve et al. (2007), Rinne et al. (2007) and Wunsch/Lech-
ner (2008). Here the evidence is mixed: Wunsch/Lechner (2008) restricted their 
sample on the age group between 25 and 49. They estimated that further vocational 
training – and other programmes – had mostly negative or insignificant effects on 
employment rates of participants 30 months after programme start. Biewen et al. 
(2007) found positive effects on employment rates of participants of age 25 to 53 for 
programmes of short and medium duration in West Germany (but not in East Ger-
many) and particular groups of unemployed. Rinne et al. (2007) obtained – two 
years after programme entry – positive effects of participation in medium length pro-
grammes on the employment probabilities of participants in all subgroups investi-
gated, covering participants of age 17 to 65. Finally, Hujer et al. (2006a) applied 
duration analysis to East German data from the years 1999 to 2002. Their main re-
sult is that participation in further vocational training prolonged unemployment dura-
tion during the period investigated. 
Short training programmes are analysed also in the already cited studies of Biewen 
et al. (2007) and Wunsch/Lechner (2008). Similar to further vocational training, 
Biewen et al. (2007) found mostly positive effects of short training-programs, while 
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Wunsch/Lechner (2008) – who separately analysed short combined measures, job-
seeker assessment and short training for minor adjustment of skills – did not. Hujer 
et al. (2006b) applied duration analysis to show that the risk of entering employment 
is significantly higher for individuals participating in a short-training programme. 
Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) distinguished between short classroom training and short 
training within firms for individuals and investigated the effect on the employment 
prospects of needy job-seekers, who receive the new basic social care. They 
showed that both variants had positive effects, which are much larger for short train-
ing within firms. Büttner (2008) used data from a social experiment on short-training 
programmes to test the availability of the unemployed. His main result was that it is 
the notification of treatment rather than participation that has an effect on leaving 
unemployment. 
Entries into job creation schemes – with an average duration of 9 to 11 months – 
have been investigated by Caliendo et al. (2006, 2008a, 2008b) and Hujer/Thomsen 
(2006). The authors applied statistical matching methods; they imposed no age re-
strictions, but estimated heterogeneous effects for groups of participants. Three 
years after programme entry in February 2000 these effects turned out to be mostly 
negative or insignificant. Exceptions were long-term unemployed, highly qualified 
men and older women in West Germany. Hujer/Zeiss (2006) evaluated these pro-
grammes in East Germany with the timing-of-events method. Their main conclusion 
is that participation in job creation schemes increases individual unemployment du-
ration of participants. Recent results on the new “One-Euro-Jobs” (Hohmeyer/Wolff 
2007), introduced in 2005, highlighted the effect heterogeneity of this programme. 
The authors found slightly positive effects in particular for participants from West 
Germany and individuals out of regular employment for a longer time period. The 
already cited study of Wunsch/Lechner (2008) also obtained negative effects of par-
ticipation in this programme on the employment prospects of participants. 
What are the results of cross-programme comparisons for Germany? First evidence 
was presented by Lechner et al. (2005), who compared participants in practice 
firms, short and long programmes providing professional skills as well as retraining, 
for programmes starting during 1994/1995. In the long run, seven years after pro-
gramme start, they obtained few significant differences between programme effects 
(Table 6.2, 46). Using more recent data, Biewen et al. (2007) conducted pairwise 
evaluations of different training programmes, including also short training pro-
grammes (“Trainingsmaßnahmen”); they observed labour market outcomes of par-
ticipants for a period of 2 to 2.5 years after treatment start. They found that partici-
pants in short training programmes would not have improved their latter employment 
rates by attending classroom or practical training. Classroom training showed no 
advantage for the treated, compared to the other programme variants. However, 
practical further training was more effective for participants than a short programme 
or – for West Germany – classroom training would have been. Wunsch/Lechner 
(2008) compared an even wider range of programmes, distinguishing three kinds of 
short training programmes, four variants of further vocational training, and public 
IAB-Discussion Paper 29/2008 10 
employment schemes. Their pairwise comparisons (Table 7, 169) showed at α = 
0.05 nearly no significant effect of participation in one programme – compared to 
participation in another programme – on the employment rates 2.5 years after 
treatment start. Exceptions were long retraining programmes that had a significant 
negative effect on employment rates of participants compared to most other pro-
grammes.  
Finally, we sketch the results of several comparative programme studies for other 
countries: Gerfin/Lechner (2002) evaluated nine different Swiss active labour market 
programmes, focussing on the first programme participation of an unemployed. 
Their study showed that temporary wage subsidies – paid in order to temporarily 
compensate income-losses in comparison to former times of employment 
(“Zwischenverdienste”) – has been most efficient in integrating participants into 
regular employment. Gerfin et al. (2004) contrasted employment programmes in 
non-profit organizations and temporary wage subsidies; again the latter were the 
more “successful” programme. Sianesi (2008) compared six major Swedish active 
labour market programmes. Employment subsidies performed best by far; they were 
followed by trainee replacement and labour market training. For Great Britain, Dor-
sett (2001) contrasted entries into subsidised employment, full-time education and 
training, an environmental task force or a voluntary sector, which were different op-
tions within the New Deal Programme for Young People. Again, wages subsidies 
dominated all other options.  
Sianesi (2008) summarises as a main result of many micro studies that the more a 
programme resembles regular employment in the competitive sector, the higher the 
programme’s benefits to its participants will be. However, the underlying selection 
process for participation in wage and start-up subsidy programmes – which are most 
similar to regular work in the private sector – differs to a larger extent from the pro-
grammes analysed in our paper: In the case of wage subsidies an employer must be 
willing to offer at least a subsidised job to an unemployed person, while founding a 
subsidised new enterprise requires that the founder has the “animal spirits” to do so.  
3 Evaluation approach and applied method 
As the majority of micro studies of active labour market programmes, our evaluation 
approach is based on the model of potential outcomes. In the following, we will 
sketch the idea of “matching on observables" and describe our applied method (ra-
dius matching on the propensity score).  
Evaluation approach 
We compare labour market outcomes of – comparable – participants receiving dif-
ferent “treatments”. In the basic version of the potential outcomes model (Rubin 
1974) an individual can potentially be in two states, while the outcome variable of 
interest may differ between these states. Based on Rubin’s work, Imbens (1999) 
and Lechner (2001) provided an extension to the case of multiple states.  
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Denote participation in one of N treatments starting at time t by St ∈ {0,1,…,N}, and 
let the corresponding potential outcomes at time t+h be given by {Y0t+h, 
Y1t+h,…,YNt+h}. Typically also non-participation at time t is interpreted as a particular 
kind of treatment. Since an individual may enter only one programme at time t, only 
one element of the latter set is observable, all other outcomes are unobserved 
“counterfactuals”. In our case the outcome variables under consideration will be the 
employment rate and cumulated days spent in regular employment after programme 
entry. Furthermore, t will be March 2003 and h will be 3.5 years.  
We assume that the value of the outcome variables for each person is not influ-
enced by the actual participation of other persons (“Stable Unit Treatment Value 
Assumption” SUTVA). Then the average effect of treatment J on participants in this 
programme, compared to receiving treatment K instead, is given by 
(1) θJKt+h = E[YJt+h – YKt+h | St = J] = E[YJt+h | St = J] – E[YKt+h| St = J]. 
In the following, we will denote participants in programme J as the “treatment group” 
and participants in programme K as the “comparison group”.  
It is not possible to observe the average counterfactual outcome that members of 
the treatment group J would have had, would they have participated in programme 
K instead [YKt+h| St = J]. Thus one has to find an adequate comparison group to im-
pute the counterfactual outcome (Rubin 1974). With non-experimental data, statisti-
cal matching techniques might be applied to find such a comparison group – but 
only for those individuals in the treatment group J that have a positive probability to 
be in programme K instead (“Common Support Condition”). 
Statistical matching relies on “matching on observables”: Assume that all variables 
X, determining the participation decision as well as the expected success of a pro-
gramme, are known and available. Then a comparison group of individuals receiving 
treatment K, with similar observable characteristics X to the treatment group J, may 
be chosen to obtain an estimate for the counterfactual outcome [YKt+h| St = J]. Simi-
lar to the binary case (Rubin 1974), Imbens (1999) and Lechner (1999, 2001) 
showed that the “Conditional Independence Assumption” (CIA) – formally given by 
Y0t+h, Y1t+h,…,YNt+h ╨ St | X – identifies the parameters of interest in the case of multi-
ple treatments.  
The identifying assumption of statistical matching techniques is that no unobserved 
heterogeneity correlated with the selection into programmes and with outcome vari-
ables remains after accounting for observable variables. Thus a major challenge is 
to identify an appropriate set of covariates. In contrast, duration analysis (in particu-
lar the timing-of-events approach by Abbring/van den Berg 2003, 2004) allows for 
selection on unobserved characteristics. But these models impose the identifying 
assumption that transition processes into labour market programmes as well as 
across labour market states can be modelled as a multivariate mixed proportional 
hazard model, while statistical matching is a non-parametric approach. 
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Since we conduct not only cross-programme comparisons, but also a comparison 
with non-participation, we have to choose the classification window in time that de-
fines participation and non-participation in a particular programme. Sianesi (2004) 
and Fredriksson/Johansson (2004) have pointed out that labour market programmes 
in Europe are ongoing and any unemployed is a potential participant at any point of 
time. Individuals may take up a programme sooner or later provided they are still 
eligible. But the unemployed themselves or the caseworker may decide against par-
ticipation, because they expect or are expected to find regular employment soon. 
Thus selecting a comparison group of individuals who never participated in any pro-
gramme would lead to base selection on expected (successful) future outcomes, 
and matching conditional on observable individual characteristics might not suffice 
to remove selectivity. Steiger (2004) and Stephan (2008) demonstrate empirically, 
how evaluation results vary with the choice of the classification window. Following 
the majority of the European literature, we do not put any restrictions on the future of 
persons and define non-participation in a particular programme as not taking up this 
programme during March 2003, but maybe at a later date. We will thus denote this 
group as “waiting”. Similarly, also participants in the programmes investigated might 
take part in another programme later.  
Applied method 
Propensity score matching is a useful simplification of matching on a high-
dimensional vector of X-variables. For a large set of variables, exact matching on all 
covariates would become a complex task. However, Rosenbaum/Rubin (1983) have 
shown that it is sufficient to match on the propensity score – the probability to join a 
programme – to obtain the same probability distribution for treated and non-treated 
individuals. Similar properties hold in a multiple treatment framework as well 
(Lechner 2001). In consequence, the same methods as in a binary treatment frame-
work can be applied. 
Participation probabilities might be estimated by any parametric, semi-parametric, or 
nonparametric regression method that can handle one- or two-dimensional vari-
ables. In the multiple treatment framework this might be achieved by two ap-
proaches. First, propensity scores could be estimated separately for each combina-
tion of programmes J and K, using for instance a binary probit or logit model. Sec-
ond, the complete choice problem can be formulated in one model and estimated, 
using for instance a multinomial logit or multinomial probit model. Lechner (2002) 
obtained basically the same estimation results, irrespective whether conditional 
probabilities were derived from a multinomial model or estimated directly. Our 
analysis is based on the first approach, estimating 81 binary probit models, since we 
compare participation in nine programme variants with participation in the other 
eight programme variants as well as with non-participation. Note that estimated ef-
fects θJKt+h and θKJt+h are not necessarily symmetric, if common support can be 
achieved only for subgroups of participants in one of the programmes. 
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Comparison group members are then chosen by radius matching (Dehejia/Wahba 
2002): Participants are matched with “synthetic comparison persons”, composed of 
a weighted equivalent of all persons falling within the radius of their propensity 
score. As more data points are used, radius matching will result in lower variances 
compared to the more common nearest neighbour matching. We apply a calliper of 
0.005, which results in a rather good quality of matching without losing too many 
observations due to missing common support. The programme impact is then esti-
mated as the mean difference in the weighted outcomes of both groups.  
All estimates are performed using the STATA-module psmatch2 (Leuven/Sianesi 
2003). Note that variance estimates for estimated treatment effects neglect that the 
propensity score itself has been estimated (Abadie/Imbens 2006). To test for the 
quality of matching the mean standardised bias (MSB) (Rosenbaum/Rubin 1983) 
between each treated group and its matched comparison group is computed across 
all variables of X. The standardised bias of a covariate is defined as the difference 
of means in the treated and matched comparison sample, divided by the square root 
of the average sample variance. Thus, a lower value of the MSB indicates more 
similarity between the two groups. Sensitivity analyses showed that radius matching 
clearly outperformed nearest neighbour matching in terms of MSB reduction. While 
no clear theoretical indication exists, which remaining bias might be acceptable, 
Caliendo/Hujer (2006) summarise as a thumb rule that most studies assess a reduc-
tion of the MSB after matching to 3 or 5 percent as sufficient. We follow this sugges-
tion and interpret pairwise comparisons where the remaining MSB after matching 
exceeded the value of 5 percent as programme types that are in fact not compara-
ble in terms of their participants.  
4 Data and variables 
This Section describes in detail the administrative data set underlying our empirical 
analysis, the selected programmes analysed and the variables used.  
Data set and analysed programmes 
The empirical analysis is based on the TrEffeR-data set (Stephan et al. 2006). This 
administrative data set has been constructed for monitoring purposes of the German 
Public Employment Service. The current version merges data flows from the distinct 
computer based operative systems of the Public Employment Service on periods of 
registered job search, registered unemployment, participation in labour market pro-
grammes and employment for the period from 2000 to 2007.  
The sample analysed here covers individuals who were unemployed for no longer 
than one year in March 2003 and of age 25 to 59. Besides long-term unemployed, 
this selection also excludes individuals eligible for specific programmes for youth 
and older workers, who may enter early retirement or choose the option available to 
them not to register as unemployed any longer. We include all individuals entering 
one of the programmes investigated during March 2003 in our analysis. A 10-
percent-sample of the group of unemployed persons not entering a programme dur-
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ing March 2003 is utilised to compute programme effects on participants compared 
to a state of “waiting”. As is mostly done in the literature, only the first programme 
entry during an unemployment spell is analysed. All estimates are performed sepa-
rately for West and East Germany. 
We restrict our analysis on the programme variants described in Overview 1 during 
March 2003. Case managers in local employment agencies have latitude in the de-
cision to grant participation in one of them. Based on the assumption that a pro-
gramme is not characterised by its type, but also by its length, we also distinguish 
between different completed programme durations (up to three months, four to six 
months, seven to 12 months and more than 12 months). Note, that our data do not 
include information on planned programme duration. Presumably, participants exit a 
programme prior to its planned completion if they find a job during participation, or if 
they do not expect to find a job even with the help of the programme. Hence, com-
pleted duration might be correlated with the outcome of treatment as well as with 
individual characteristics and we cannot rule out endogeneity of this variable. 
Overview 1 
Analysed programme variants 
 Programme variant 
a) Provision of specific professional skills, which might con-
tain occupation-related training and general training (berufsbe-
zogene übergreifende Weiterbildung, berufspraktische Weiter-
bildung oder berufliche Aufstiegsweiterbildung). 
b) Practical training in a practice firm, without trainees working 
in a “real” company (berufliche Weiterbildung  in einer Übungs-
firma, Übungswerkstatt oder sonstigen Übungseinrichtung) 
1. Further vocational trai-
ning (Förderung beruf-
licher Weiterbildung) 
c) Long retraining programmes, conducted firm-external within 
a group (Gruppenmaßnahme mit Abschluss in anerkanntem 
Ausbildungsberuf) 
a) Short classroom training, aimed at the improvement of 
knowledge and skills (Nicht-betriebliche Trainingsmaßnahme 
zur Vermittlung von Kenntnissen) 
2. Short training  
(Trainingsmaßnahme) 
b) Short firm-internal training, aimed at the improvement of 
knowledge and skills (Betriebliche Trainingsmaßnahme zur 
Vermittlung von Kenntnissen) 
3. Job creation scheme of the traditional type (Arbeitsbeschaffungsmaßnahme) 
 
Participation in each of the programmes is also compared with non-participation in 
March 2003 in the sense of “waiting”. As has already been mentioned, participants 
as well as non-participants may enter (further) programmes after March 2003. In 
fact, many of them do so: Using the same data set as we do in this paper, Stephan 
(2008) shows for a restricted set of programmes that typically around 40 to 50 per-
cent of those not starting a treatment during March 2003 and around 50 to 70 per-
cent of those taking-up a programme in March 2003 also participated in at least one 
(further) programme starting after March 2003. 
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Variables 
We estimate programme effects on participants using two outcome variables: First, 
we compute cumulated days spent in regular, unsubsidised employment during the 
3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003. Second, we compute shares in 
regular, unsubsidised employment 3.5 years after programme entry. Periods, during 
which an individual is supported for instance by a wage subsidy are not interpreted 
as a “success” in this sense. Since the classification window encompasses only one 
month, outcome variables for “waiting” non-participants are measured since March 
15, 2003, and all individuals who had already left unemployment at this date were 
excluded from the sample. 
The message conveyed by these outcome variables is quite different: Cumulated 
effects display the evolvement of estimated programme effects over the entire ob-
servation period of time; they can be computed as the integral over employment 
shares during each day of the observation period. Thus they account for locking-in 
effects – times of reduced search – over the time period of programme participation. 
The share in regular employment at the end of the observation period refers only to 
one particular reporting day. It can, however, be interpreted as an indicator that 
shows how cumulated days in employment will develop further after the end of the 
observation period. If the average effect on the share of participants in employment 
in positive, we can expect that also the average effect on cumulated days will de-
velop further in a “positive direction”. 
The choice of comparison groups is based on the variables described in Overview 
2, which are all categorised as dummy variables. The variables allow controlling for 
a wide range of individual characteristics, including past experiences with the Public 
Employment Service. Since the data include also information on previous unem-
ployment histories, which should capture most of the effects of unobserved individ-
ual factors (Heckman et. al 1999), unobserved individual heterogeneity should not 
be a serious problem for the analysis. However, regarding short firm-internal pro-
grammes, the lack of information on employer characteristics may produce a bias in 
the estimates if participating individuals are working in average within firms with 
other characteristics than non-participants do (Jaenichen/Stephan 2007).  
Mean values of selected explaining variables can be found in Table A.1 in the Ap-
pendix. It shows that participants in a specific programme differ in fact from the av-
erage non-participant as well as from participants in other programmes. In particu-
lar, participants in all training programmes seem to be a positive selection of unem-
ployed persons, whereas those joining a job creation scheme can be considered as 
a negative selection. 
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Overview 2 
Explaining variables 
 Variables 
Socio-demographic characteristics, meas-
ured at the start of an unemployment spell 
Age, marital status, nationality, education, 
degree of disablement, but also information 
on the kind of benefit receipt 
Unemployment duration in current spell Months until programme entry in March 2003 
for participants; months until March 15, 2003 
for matched comparison persons 
Unemployment-history in the two years 
preceding the analysed unemployment 
spell, measured at the start of the unem-
ployment spell 
Former unemployment, participation in labour 
market programs, sanctions and periods of 
illness 
Regional labour market situation Performance cluster of the regional labour 
market (Blien et al. 2004) 
 
5 Empirical Results 
The main results of our empirical analysis are summarised in Table 2. Panel I and II 
display average treatment effects of receiving treatment J (in rows) for the partici-
pants in this programme, compared to receiving treatment K (in columns), where the 
latter outcome is imputed by means of a comparison group that has participated in 
programme K. While Panel I shows the effect on cumulated days spent in regular, 
unsubsidised employment during the 3.5 years after programme entry, Panel II 
shows the effect on the share in regular employment at the end of the observation 
period. Only those pairwise comparisons are presented, for which a mean standard-
ised bias (MSB) below 5 could be achieved in the matching procedure. Compari-
sons with a higher MSB are indicated with an “x”; our interpretation is that for these 
combinations treatment and comparison group are too different in terms of their 
characteristics to draw any conclusions how members of the one programme would 
have fared in the other programme. 
A more detailed representation of the results can be found in Table A.2 to A.4 in the 
Appendix. Table A.2 contains information on the MSB before and after matching and 
on the number of observations in the treatment and comparison group after the 
matching took place. The number of observations might be reduced in comparison 
to the descriptive statistics in Table A.1 due to the requirement of common support 
(we set a calliper of 0.005) – this implies that results are not valid for the entire set of 
treated persons, but only for those that are in common support. Table A.3 contains 
the average values of both outcome variables for treatment and comparison groups, 
whose difference is the average treatment effect on the treated, given in Table 2.  
Joining a programme compared to “waiting” 
We begin with a discussion of the mean effects of a programme entry compared to 
no or a later participation (“waiting”); this is the comparison most often presented in 
studies of active labour market programmes. Results at the end of the observation 
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period are summarised in the last column of Table 2 and in Figure 1. The develop-
ment of estimated treatment effects over the entire observation period is shown in 
Figure A.1 and Figure A.2 in the Appendix. Since we analyse only entries from one 
selected month, seasonal patterns of employment can be observed clearly in Figure 
A.2.  
Table 2 
Average effects of treatment J on participants in this programme compared to 
participation in programme K 
    Comparison group K 
        Pract. Retrai- Short training Job creation   
    Provision of skills firm ning firm- class- scheme Waiting
Treatment group J up to 3 4-6 7-12 4-6 > 12 internal room 4-6 7-12   
I. Cumulated days in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003   
Provision of skills  West     28   85 ** 71   317 ** -100** 74 ** x   158 ** 103 **
   up to 3 months East     22   150 ** -11   391 ** -65 * 110 ** 269 ** x   119 **
Provision of skills  West -7       63 ** 57   284 ** -130** 55 ** x   x   70 **
   4-6 months East -9       115 ** 25   368 ** -77 ** 100 ** 197 ** x   119 **
Provision of skills West -92 ** -56 **    x   228 ** -200** -18   x   x   14   
   7-12 months East -87 * -102 **    -52   x   -190** 6   148 ** 169 ** 31   
Practice firm  West -68 * -46   19      237 ** -201** 8   x   x   21   
   4-6 months East -95   x   31      222 ** -178** 37   151 ** x   54   
Retraining  West -270 ** -282 ** -211** x      -376** -208** x   x   -167**
   > 12 months East x   -328 ** -220** x      -402** -181** x   x   -184**
Short firm-internal West 111 ** 125 ** 190 ** 197 ** 432 **    183 ** x   x   199 **
   Training East 80 * 55 * 171 ** 130 ** 425 **    187 ** x   x   212 **
Short classroom West -59 * -44 ** 2   31   228 ** -192**    x   x   28 **
   Training East -103 ** -108 ** -10   -37   x   -201**    106 ** x   24* 
Job creation  West x   x   -34   x   x   -211** -63 *     58 * -9   
   4-6 months East x   x   x   x   x   -272** -110**     x   -62 **
Job creation West -163 ** x   -79 ** x   x   x   -111** -119 **     -68 **
   7-12 months East x   x   x   x   x   -343** -104** -36       -62 **
II. Share in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003 
Provision of skills  West     -0.04   -0.02   -0.04   -0.07   -0.05 ** 0.05 * x   0.03   0.09 **
   up to 3 months East     -0.09 * -0.03   -0.13 * -0.09   -0.07 * 0.05   0.18 ** x   0.07 * 
Provision of skills  West 0.05 *     0.03   0.00   -0.04   -0.02   0.08 ** x   x   0.12 **
   4-6 months East 0.07       0.02   -0.04   -0.01   0.00   0.12 ** 0.20 ** x   0.16 **
Provision of skills West 0.01   -0.02      x   -0.04   -0.05 ** 0.05 ** x   x   0.10 **
   7-12 months East 0.05   -0.02      -0.03   x   -0.02   0.11 ** 0.19 ** 0.15 ** 0.15 **
Practice firm  West 0.03   0.00   0.01      -0.05   -0.05   0.08 ** x   x   0.11 **
   4-6 months East 0.02   x   0.01      -0.11   -0.02   0.11 * 0.17 ** x   0.14 **
Retraining  West 0.10 ** 0.03   0.07 * x      0.05 * 0.13 ** x   x   0.18 **
   > 12 months East x   0.05   0.04   x      0.04   0.17 ** x   x   0.19 **
Short firm-internal West 0.06 ** 0.01   0.05 * 0.05   -0.02      0.10 ** x   x   0.14 **
   training East 0.08 * -0.01   0.01   0.01   -0.01      0.12 ** x   x   0.16 **
Short classroom West 0.00   -0.08 ** -0.06 ** -0.05   -0.13 ** -0.11 **    x   x   0.04 **
   training East -0.05   -0.13 ** -0.11 ** -0.08   x   -0.14 **    0.07   x   0.04 **
Job creation  West x   x   -0.06   x   x   -0.11 ** -0.04       -0.03   0.04   
   4-6 months East x   x   x   x   x   -0.16 ** -0.07 *     x   0.01   
Job creation West -0.02   x   -0.02   x   x   x   -0.02   -0.04       0.04   
   7-12 months East x   x   x   x   x   -0.17 ** -0.02   0.00       0.03   
*) α = 0.05, **) α = 0.01, x) Information not displayed, due to insufficient match quality (MSB ≥ 5). 
Shaded area = significant negative effect of treatment in pairwise comparison. 
Bold type = significant positive effect of treatment in pairwise comparison. 
Numbers of observations and mean standardised biases are given in Table A.2. 
Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
 
We give an example: Persons from West Germany who joined a further vocational 
training programme aiming at the provision of skills with a duration of up to three 
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months in March 2003, spent 103 days more in regular employment during the 3.5 
years after programme start than members of the matched comparison group not 
joining a programme (Panel I of Table 2). Their share in regular employment was 9 
percentage points higher at the end of the observation period (Panel II of Table 2). 
For this combination, Table A.2 shows that the quality of the matching is excellent, 
reducing the MSB after matching to a value of 0.9. Table A.3 in the Appendix con-
tributes the information that the average treatment effect on the treated is the result 
of in average 515 and 412 days spent in a regular job within the groups of partici-
pants and matched comparison persons, respectively. Shares in employment 
amounted to 0.50 and 0.41, respectively. Finally, Figure A.2 shows that seasonal 
employment effects are more important for the comparison group than for the 
treated group. 
Figure 1 
Average treatment effects of participation in selected programmes compared to waiting 
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Note: Outcome variables are measured 3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003.  
Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
 
Panel I of Table 2 and Figure 1 show rather mixed results of programme participa-
tion on cumulated days the participants have spent in regular employment during 
the 3.5 years after treatment start. We find significant positive effects of further vo-
cational training providing professional skills with programme durations of up to six 
months. Longer training providing skills for six to 12 months as well as training in 
practice firms for four to six months has insignificant effects on the number of days 
in regular employment. The cumulated effect of long retraining programmes is sig-
nificantly negative. This is however, not surprising, since substantial lock-in effects 
are a necessary side-effect of this kind of programmes. Regarding short training 
programmes, the effect on days spent in employment amounts to about 200 days for 
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firm-internal programmes, but is small for classroom training. This underlines the 
fact that it is important to distinguish between different variants of short training pro-
grammes. Finally, job creation schemes with duration between four and 12 months 
have mostly significant negative effects on cumulated days spent in employment. 
A surprising fact is, however, that we obtain mostly significantly positive effects on 
shares of participants in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry. The 
only exceptions are job creation schemes, which have insignificant effects at the 
end of the observation period. Furthermore, effects are largest for long retraining 
schemes. Thus one can expect that also cumulated effects could have turned posi-
tive for all further training programmes and short training programmes investigated – 
but not for job creation schemes – if the observation period would have been longer.  
These results are in line with those obtained by Biewen et al. (2007) and Rinne et al. 
(2007), who found also (at least partly) positive employment effects of further voca-
tional training and short training programmes. They are, however, in contrast to the 
findings of Wunsch/Lechner (2008) for the programmes mentioned above as well as 
for job creation schemes. One reason for the different results might be that the latter 
analysed a shorter time period after programme entry (30 months compared to 42 
months in this study), while programme effects might take some time to break-even. 
Second, Wunsch/Lechner (2008) restricted their sample to the age group 25 to 53. 
However, our results are even more positive, if we introduce a similar age restric-
tion. Third, we analyse only (short-term unemployed) persons who entered a pro-
gramme during the first year of their unemployment spell. Fourth, Wunsch/Lechner 
(2008) defined non-participants as persons who did not enter a programme during 
the 18 months following the inflow date into their sample. Thus their definition of 
non-treatment requires that no treatment has occurred up to a period of 18 months 
after entry into unemployment. In contrast, Biewen et al. (2007) as well as Rinne et 
al. (2007) performed separate estimates by duration of unemployment at the begin-
ning of a treatment and require only that non-participants have not entered a meas-
ure during an accordingly chosen classification window. We have defined all those 
individuals as non-participants who did not enter a programme during one single 
month.  
For job creation schemes our results are similar to the findings of Caliendo et al. 
(2006, 2008a, 2008b). Our findings are slightly better as far as we obtain no nega-
tive, but insignificant effects of participation on shares in employment at the end of 
the observation period. But note that we observe outcome variables for a slightly 
longer period of time (42 instead of 36 months) and that we analyse programme 
entries starting three years later than these authors did (2003 instead of 2000). 
Pairwise comparison of programme participations 
We turn now to a pairwise comparison of participation in particular programs. The 
first fact to note is that participants in variants of further vocational training schemes 
and short training schemes may be compared in most cases with each other. They 
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may, however, quite often not be compared with individuals joining a job creation 
scheme (denoted through combinations with an “x” in Table 2). Participants in the 
latter can be supposed as a “negative” selection of unemployed – the more so as 
job creation schemes are often used for long-term unemployed or “hard-to-place” 
workers. Hence, it not surprising that it turns out to be difficult to find a comparable 
group of individuals supported by a training scheme. Also the reduction of observa-
tions comparing Table A.2 with Table A.1 shows that some observations are lost 
due to common support requirements, when one strives to compare participants in 
further vocational training with those in job creation schemes. 
Regarding further vocational training programmes, it seems that shorter pro-
grammes have the effect that participants have spent more days in regular employ-
ment during the observation period. However, the negative, while mostly insignifi-
cant differences, in shares in employment indicate that this “advantage” may not 
continue to increase, but start to decline over time. Thus the more positive effects of 
shorter programmes on cumulated days spent in employment are clearly an effect of 
the lock-in effects of participation increasing with programme duration. Furthermore, 
differences in both outcome variables are mostly insignificant comparing training, 
aimed at the provision of skills, and training in a practice firm. 
Lock-in effects are naturally largest for long retraining programmes, and thus retrain-
ing performs worst among all programmes when comparing cumulated days in regu-
lar employment during the 3.5 years after programme start. However, the share in 
employment at the end of the observation period in West Germany is marginally 
significantly larger than it is the case for several shorter further vocational training 
programmes. This implies that the effectiveness of retraining programmes on cumu-
lated days in employment could be supposed to increase further over time. For this 
programme, Lechner et al. (2005, Table 6.1, 38) found rather positive but only partly 
significant results for an observation period of seven years, compared to shorter 
programmes.  
The “winners” in the pairwise comparison are obviously short training programmes 
conducted within firms: Participants spend more days in regular employment than 
those in every other programme, while they would have fared far worse in most 
other programmes. Additional analyses showed that this would be even more the 
case for wage subsidies (which are not included in the comparison presented here). 
The explanation at hand is that short firm-internal training programmes are – simi-
larly to wage subsidies – not only a training programme, but rather a training pro-
gramme in combination with access to a firm. They offer participants the possibility 
not only to increase their productivity, but also to convey their productivity to a po-
tential employer. They may thus be used as a kind of cheap probation period by 
employers, where the “wage” is paid by the Public Employment Service.  
In contrast, participants in short classroom training have spent less days in regular 
employment during the observation period than those individuals participating in 
further vocational training aimed at the provision of skills with an duration of up to 6 
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months; and also participants in the latter fared better with their training compared to 
a short classroom training. Thus one might conclude that previous results of Biewen 
et al. (2007) and Wunsch/Lechner (2008), who obtained no advantages of participa-
tion in further vocational training compared to short programmes, is partly a result of 
the fact that these authors did not distinguish between variants of short training pro-
grammes.  
As has already been noted, participation in job creation schemes may quite often 
not be compared with participation in another of the investigated programmes. In 
particular, matching quality was not satisfactory for pairwise comparisons of partici-
pants in job creation schemes and in long retraining programmes; these groups 
seem to differ strongly. For instance (Table A.1), participants in job creation 
schemes were in average older, had more often health problems, had less often 
obtained a secondary degree, and have spent more time in unemployment (in the 
years preceding the current spell as well as in the current unemployment spell). The 
same applies to participants in long-term job creation schemes (six to 12 months) 
compared to participants in medium-term training (four to six months), aimed at the 
provision of skills or in a practice firm. However, when a comparison with other pro-
grammes was feasible, participation in job creations schemes achieved worse em-
ployment effects compared to participation in training schemes. 
6 Conclusions 
Our paper conducted a pairwise comparison of the effects of participation in further 
training programmes, short training programmes and job creation schemes, starting 
in March 2003, as well as of not entering a programme during this month. The 
analysis is restricted to persons of age 25 to 59 and on the first programme during 
the first year of an unemployment spell.  
Compared to non-participation in the sense of “waiting”, we find that participation in 
further vocational training aimed at the provision of skills as well as short training 
programmes increase the number of days, participants have spent in regular em-
ployment during the 3.5 years after programme start. In contrast, participation in 
retraining and job creation schemes decreases the number of days. However, all 
programmes had a positive impact on the share of participants in regular employ-
ment at the end of the observation period. 
The pairwise comparison of programmes conveys the impression that across further 
vocational training programmes, shorter programmes perform overall better; this is 
mostly the result of shorter lock-in effects. Also further training aimed at the provi-
sion of skills with duration of up to six months seems to be more advantageous than 
short classroom training. In contrast, short firm-internal training is by the far the most 
“successful” programme in the portfolio of programmes included into this investiga-
tion. This is, however, probably related to the fundamentally different design of this 
programme, which requires an employer willing to offer a training opportunity.  
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Finally, regarding their observed characteristics, participants in job creation 
schemes differ so strongly from participants in other programmes that a direct com-
parison is mostly not feasible. This might be taken as a hint that participants in this 
programme – whose objective is explicitly not to achieve employment but to in-
crease employability – are in fact a strongly selected group of hard-to-place indi-
viduals. Other programmes available in the time period investigated might not have 
been suiteable for this group. Thus it remains at least questionable if participation in 
another programme could have improved the labour market prospects of partici-
pants in job creation schemes. 
Summing up, our results are rather favourable regarding the effects of further voca-
tional training programmes and of short firm-internal training on the employment 
prospects of participants. In this respect our results are more similar to those ob-
tained by Biewen et al. (2007) and Rinne et al. (2007) than to the findings of 
Wunsch/Lechner (2008). However, our results highlight also the strong heterogene-
ity in the effects of variants of short training programmes, which has also been no-
ticed by Wolff/Jozwiak (2007) and Stephan et al. (2006). Finally, we confirm previ-
ous findings of Caliendo et al. (2006, 2008a, 2008b) and Hujer/Thomsen (2006) that 
job creation schemes are no effective means to get unemployed persons into em-
ployment. But our findings show also that participants in these schemes are not 
really comparable with participants in training schemes with regard to their charac-
teristics. 
While these results complement existing evidence for Germany, it is important to 
keep in mind that our evaluation design does not isolate the effects of a single inter-
vention. A companion paper has shown that a high share of programme participants 
enters a further programme and that a high share of those “waiting” take up at least 
one programme later (Stephan 2008). Thus, further research in particular on pro-
gramme careers is called for. 
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Appendix: Additional Figures and Tables 
Table A.1 
Variable means of selected attributes (0 = no, 1 = yes) before matching 
 
   Provision of skills Practice firm Retraining Short training Job creation scheme Waiting 
 
   up to 3 m. 4-6 months 7-12 months 4-6 months > 12 months firm classroom 4-6 months 7-12 months    
 
 Variables West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East
Female 0.36 0.23 0.47 0.32 0.44 0.41 0.56 0.40 0.52 0.63 0.33 0.33 0.55 0.44 0.47 0.42 0.43 0.49 0.41 0.44
Age 25-29 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.14 0.11 0.16 0.18 0.29 0.18 0.25 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.23 0.24 0.21 0.25 0.25 0.22
Age 30-34 0.19 0.17 0.21 0.17 0.22 0.20 0.19 0.17 0.25 0.26 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.11 0.07 0.10 0.06 0.17 0.13
Age 35-39 0.21 0.19 0.24 0.22 0.22 0.21 0.18 0.13 0.25 0.27 0.20 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.15 0.10 0.14 0.11 0.18 0.16
Age 40-44 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.14 0.18 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.19 0.15 0.14 0.16 0.11 0.16 0.18
Age 45-49 0.15 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.12 0.19 0.18 0.17 0.06 0.08 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.16 0.16 0.20 0.21 0.17 0.13 0.16
Age 50-54 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.10 0.07 0.13 0.01 0.03 0.06 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.21 0.25 0.18 0.29 0.12 0.15
Age 54-59 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.11 0.19 0.14 0.20 0.09 0.10
Health problems 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.15 0.09 0.20 0.19 0.13 0.10
Slightly disabled 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.07 0.03 0.02
Severly disabled 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.10 0.07 0.11 0.12 0.04 0.02
Married 0.51 0.55 0.54 0.58 0.52 0.57 0.55 0.64 0.48 0.58 0.46 0.54 0.51 0.54 0.48 0.71 0.49 0.64 0.53 0.55
Married and female 0.19 0.12 0.26 0.20 0.24 0.26 0.33 0.25 0.26 0.41 0.13 0.21 0.29 0.26 0.24 0.31 0.21 0.35 0.24 0.27
Foreigner 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.03 0.12 0.01 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.00 0.11 0.02 0.15 0.02 0.11 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.18 0.02
Without secondary degree 0.08 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.04 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.07 0.04 0.09 0.03 0.12 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.15 0.06
Secondary degree (Hauptschule) 0.44 0.13 0.40 0.16 0.29 0.15 0.46 0.13 0.45 0.11 0.47 0.18 0.40 0.21 0.34 0.31 0.41 0.31 0.53 0.30
Secondary degree (Realschule) 0.29 0.74 0.29 0.67 0.27 0.67 0.34 0.68 0.31 0.77 0.28 0.67 0.27 0.65 0.34 0.56 0.28 0.53 0.19 0.57
Secondary degree (Gymnasium) 0.20 0.10 0.23 0.13 0.40 0.17 0.13 0.17 0.18 0.10 0.19 0.11 0.24 0.12 0.20 0.08 0.19 0.12 0.14 0.07
Without vocational training 0.25 0.05 0.27 0.07 0.18 0.05 0.26 0.04 0.46 0.09 0.23 0.07 0.26 0.08 0.29 0.06 0.35 0.09 0.40 0.14
Vocational training 0.68 0.90 0.62 0.85 0.62 0.83 0.71 0.83 0.50 0.87 0.69 0.87 0.61 0.84 0.59 0.89 0.53 0.84 0.54 0.82
University degree 0.08 0.05 0.11 0.08 0.20 0.12 0.03 0.13 0.04 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.12 0.07 0.12 0.05 0.11 0.07 0.06 0.04
Unemployment benefit receipt 0.64 0.74 0.61 0.69 0.59 0.67 0.64 0.69 0.53 0.56 0.65 0.65 0.57 0.57 0.70 0.69 0.65 0.66 0.48 0.52
Unemployment assistance receipt 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.13 0.08 0.18 0.08 0.17 0.12 0.30 0.10 0.15 0.08 0.20 0.17 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.13 0.22
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No benefit receipt 0.26 0.16 0.29 0.19 0.34 0.15 0.28 0.15 0.34 0.15 0.25 0.20 0.34 0.23 0.13 0.11 0.15 0.12 0.38 0.26
Unemployed up to 1 month 0.55 0.46 0.57 0.46 0.59 0.39 0.54 0.47 0.52 0.34 0.49 0.36 0.59 0.39 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.26 0.45 0.28
Unemployed 1-6 months 0.22 0.22 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.19 0.23 0.19 0.18 0.16 0.24 0.22 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.16 0.17 0.17 0.20 0.17
Unemployed 7-12 months 0.14 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.12 0.19 0.14 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.24 0.12 0.18 0.20 0.22 0.21 0.26 0.17 0.23
Unemployed 13-18 months 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.06 0.12 0.08 0.16 0.08 0.12 0.06 0.14 0.12 0.16 0.14 0.18 0.10 0.18
Unemployed 19-24 months 0.04 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.18 0.03 0.06 0.04 0.10 0.10 0.11 0.14 0.13 0.09 0.14
Labour market programme 0.25 0.37 0.21 0.35 0.21 0.44 0.19 0.39 0.27 0.51 0.30 0.47 0.21 0.42 0.35 0.39 0.44 0.52 0.20 0.42
Period of sickness 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.05 0.16 0.11 0.13 0.07 0.17 0.09 0.14 0.08 0.17 0.16 0.19 0.16 0.27 0.13 0.21
b
)
 
2
-
y
e
a
r
-
h
i
s
t
o
r
y
 
Sanctions 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03 0.00 0.05 0.02
1st month of unemployment 0.10 0.15 0.09 0.13 0.10 0.14 0.09 0.10 0.14 0.25 0.17 0.14 0.11 0.08 0.10 0.04 0.08 0.06 0.13 0.11
2nd month of unemployment 0.10 0.20 0.11 0.12 0.10 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.12 0.08 0.15 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.10 0.14 0.11
3rd month of unemployment 0.16 0.14 0.13 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.16 0.15 0.11 0.10 0.15 0.17 0.18 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.16 0.17
4th month of unemployment 0.10 0.12 0.11 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.10 0.12 0.09 0.11 0.13
5th month of unemployment 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.10 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.09 0.09
6th month of unemployment 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.12 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.09 0.10 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.07
7th month of unemployment 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.09 0.11 0.09 0.07 0.06
8th month of unemployment 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.05 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.10 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05
9th month of unemployment 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.09 0.10 0.08 0.06 0.06 0.06
10th month of unemployment 0.06 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.04 0.07 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.09 0.08 0.06 0.04 0.05
11th month of unemployment 0.04 0.02 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.04 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04
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12th month of unemployment 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.05 0.06 0.10 0.06 0.08 0.04 0.05
Mean programme duration 59 54 149 147 277 280 155 150 812 824 33 23 46 39 172 175 326 312 - - 
 
 
Observations 818 390 1414 432 1662 762 401 163 725 466 3135 1057 5716 2403 449 792 498 590 14441 5744
Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data.
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Table A.2 
Mean standardized bias before and after matching and number of observations within common support for treatment  
groups J and comparison groups K 
    Comparison group K 
Provision of skills Practice firm Retraining Short training Job creation scheme  Waiting   up to 3 m. 4-6 months 7-12 months 4-6 months > 12 months firm-internal classroom 4-6 months 7-12 months    
Treatment group J West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East 
MSB before    6.1 8.0 9.9 11.6 10.3 12.4 11.0 17.9 6.6 9.7 9.4 12.5 19.0 22.7 18.1 23.2 10.9 15.7
MSB after    1.3 2.9 1.7 2.0 4.7 6.0 3.6 4.9 1.1 1.5 1.0 1.2 10.1 5.0 5.0 5.4 0.9 0.9
Observations J    783 367 765 361 707 317 713 296 788 374 789 375 628 296 662 228 793 377
Provision of skills 
  up to 3 months 
Observations K    1348 381 1574 679 362 138 638 342 3063 959 5468 2109 319 554 356 375 13416 4924
MSB before 6.1 8.0     7.0 8.3 9.6 10.2 9.8 15.2 8.1 7.2 6.0 8.6 19.1 19.5 18.5 18.4 10.5 12.6
MSB after 1.6 3.6     1.4 1.7 2.4 3.9 3.3 4.7 1.0 2.1 0.7 1.1 14.6 4.8 7.4 6.1 0.6 0.9
Observations J 1346 380     1342 395 1206 337 1273 346 1349 408 1354 411 1245 335 1265 346 1358 409
Provision of skills 
   4-6 months 
Observations K 783 366     1562 672 378 140 668 407 3066 969 5469 2016 287 552 342 363 13446 4692
MSB before 9.9 11.6 7.0 8.3     13.9 5.9 12.3 12.9 12.3 7.9 9.2 5.9 19.6 17.1 19.6 16.8 13.7 10.2
MSB after 1.9 4.0 1.5 2.6     5.9 4.0 3.8 5.9 1.4 1.8 1.0 0.8 12.9 4.3 7.6 4.3 1.0 1.2
Observations J 1569 675 1561 672     1391 662 1496 645 1564 702 1581 701 1429 665 1389 619 1585 708
Provision of skills 
   7-12 months 
Observations K 765 361 1341 395     365 151 666 413 3063 994 5430 2168 335 591 360 405 13453 4868
MSB before 10.3 12.4 9.6 10.2 13.9 5.9     15.2 15.3 11.3 10.0 11.6 7.4 23.0 16.2 23.5 17.5 13.8 11.0
MSB after 3.1 4.5 1.4 8.2 3.1 1.6     4.6 4.8 1.5 3.3 1.2 1.0 12.7 4.6 9.0 6.7 0.8 2.6
Observations J 362 138 379 139 365 151     327 122 385 153 384 157 192 133 246 110 386 157
Practice firm 
    4-6 months 
Observations K 717 318 1231 344 1543 668     552 360 3026 941 5466 2086 251 461 186 363 13441 4726
MSB before 11.0 17.9 9.8 15.2 12.3 12.9 15.2 15.3     12.2 14.2 11.6 14.6 18.7 20.5 17.5 19.1 11.5 16.8
MSB after 2.5 5.5 2.4 4.5 2.2 3.1 5.6 6.4     1.5 2.5 1.5 2.0 9.1 7.2 7.4 5.8 0.9 1.4
Observations J 635 335 669 403 665 414 536 354     670 428 679 421 452 357 545 320 681 440
Retraining 
   > 12 months 
Observations K 716 301 1282 346 1514 646 328 122     3017 902 5296 2018 241 373 257 248 12252 4446
MSB before 6.6 9.7 8.1 7.2 12.3 7.9 11.3 10.0 12.2 14.2     9.4 6.2 20.6 18.9 19.3 19.1 9.7 10.0
MSB after 1.6 3.1 1.5 2.1 1.9 2.2 3.6 4.3 4.7 2.8     0.8 0.6 11.7 5.4 7.8 5.8 0.4 0.6
Observations J 3059 957 3062 965 3056 995 2933 920 2982 893     3067 1008 2971 925 2948 880 3067 1012
Short firm-internal 
   training 
Observations K 788 374 1349 408 1564 703 385 153 670 428     5425 2173 341 597 366 385 13485 4810
MSB before 9.4 12.5 6.0 8.6 9.2 5.9 11.6 7.4 11.6 14.6 9.4 6.2     21.4 17.1 20.7 16.5 9.8 5.9
MSB after 3.7 4.1 1.2 2.6 1.9 1.7 4.2 3.4 2.9 8.0 1.2 1.2     14.2 4.7 9.0 5.9 0.4 0.6
Observations J 5430 2086 5464 1975 5394 2168 5195 2056 5069 1958 5416 2171     4747 2137 4902 2080 5474 2186
Short classroom 
   training 
Observations K 790 376 1355 411 1581 701 384 157 680 422 3068 1008     381 621 398 443 13464 4927
MSB before 19.0 22.7 19.1 19.5 19.6 17.1 23.0 16.2 18.7 20.5 20.6 18.9 21.4 17.1     8.6 11.2 19.3 15.5
MSB after 6.2 11.6 5.3 7.9 3.6 5.4 15.9 9.6 6.9 10.3 4.1 4.9 4.7 2.6     2.7 5.1 3.2 3.5
Observations J 315 475 281 479 335 579 167 442 229 323 341 592 381 621     385 581 399 657
Job creation scheme 
   4-6 months 
Observations K 653 298 1267 336 1472 666 221 133 468 365 3035 934 5460 2184     374 448 13434 4947
MSB before 18.1 23.2 18.5 18.4 19.6 16.8 23.5 17.5 17.5 19.1 19.3 19.1 20.7 16.5 8.6 11.2     16.6 15.1
MSB after 4.7 9.6 5.1 9.1 3.8 5.2 9.2 10.2 5.2 10.0 5.2 4.5 3.5 4.5 3.4 2.6     2.9 2.2
Observations J 354 369 338 350 360 400 176 344 244 240 365 384 398 443 373 446     410 458
Job creation scheme 
   7-12 months 
Observations K 688 230 1320 348 1449 625 255 110 566 323 3066 902 5468 2130 384 585     13452 4823
Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
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Table A.3 
Average outcomes for treatment groups J and comparison groups K 
Comparison group K 
Provision of skills Practice firm Retraining Short training Job creation scheme Waiting 
up to 3 months 4-6 months 7-12 months 4-6 months > 12 months firm-internal classroom 4-6 months 7-12 months   
 
Treatment group J 
West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East West East 
I. Cumulated days in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003 
J     515 615 516 624 520 619 524 615 518 607 514 609 490 575 482 525 515 611Provision of skills 
   up to 3 months K    487 593 431 474 449 630 208 224 619 672 440 499 397 307 324 277 412 492
J 484 591     484 580 491 606 487 580 482 570 483 571 480 552 483 540 483 572Provision of skills 
   4-6 months K 492 599     422 465 434 581 203 212 613 647 427 470 346 354 339 275 413 453
J 413 444 412 447     414 438 416 452 410 440 412 440 414 435 407 429 412 439Provision of skills 
   7-12 months K 505 531 468 550     413 490 188 224 610 630 430 434 472 286 357 260 399 408
J 432 487 435 504 443 463     434 439 434 467 434 460 436 446 403 420 435 463Practice firm 
   4-6 months K 501 582 481 546 424 432     197 217 635 646 426 424 455 295 350 243 414 408
J 220 216 216 218 214 227 222 223     219 224 217 223 199 219 209 221 217 224Retraining 
   > 12 months K 489 527 498 547 425 447 421 431     595 627 425 405 525 319 409 286 384 408
J 636 640 636 637 636 637 638 639 639 650     636 638 634 638 630 629 636 637Short firm-internal  
   training K 525 560 511 582 446 466 441 509 207 225     453 451 517 302 354 304 437 425
J 418 423 417 429 419 413 418 413 427 428 419 414     413 411 417 414 417 411Short classroom  
    training K 477 526 461 538 417 423 387 451 199 202 611 615     444 305 318 274 389 388
J 327 249 329 261 319 255 361 252 329 279 307 252 299 250     291 239 296 238Job creation  
   4-6 months K 424 435 410 464 353 344 320 379 202 222 518 524 362 359     233 216 304 300
J 242 228 246 218 235 216 282 222 276 250 241 227 230 215 224 216     226 215Job creation  
   7-12 months K 405 438 373 383 313 331 353 337 198 226 490 570 341 320 343 252     294 277
II. Share in regular employment, 3.5 years after programme entry in March 2003 
J     0.50 0.58 0.50 0.58 0.51  0.58 0.51 0.59 0.50 0.57 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.54 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.57Provision of skills 
   up to 3 months K     0.53 0.67 0.52 0.61 0.55  0.71 0.57 0.68 0.56 0.64 0.45 0.52 0.42 0.36 0.45 0.41 0.41 0.50
J 0.53 0.64     0.53 0.63 0.53 0.65 0.53 0.62 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.62 0.52 0.61 0.53 0.58 0.52 0.62Provision of skills 
   4-6 months K 0.48 0.57     0.50 0.61 0.53 0.69 0.56 0.63 0.54 0.61 0.44 0.50 0.37 0.41 0.44 0.40 0.41 0.46
J 0.50 0.57 0.49 0.59     0.50 0.58 0.50 0.58 0.49 0.58 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.57 0.49 0.56 0.49 0.58Provision of skills 
   7-12 months K 0.48 0.52 0.52 0.60     0.56 0.61 0.54 0.63 0.54 0.59 0.44 0.47 0.49 0.38 0.50 0.41 0.40 0.42
J 0.51 0.59 0.52 0.60 0.53 0.58     0.53 0.56 0.52 0.58 0.51 0.57 0.51 0.55 0.50 0.52 0.52 0.57Practice firm 
   4-6 months K 0.48 0.56 0.52 0.59 0.51 0.57     0.57 0.67 0.56 0.60 0.43 0.46 0.46 0.37 0.42 0.36 0.40 0.43
J 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.63     0.57 0.63 0.57 0.62 0.55 0.62 0.57 0.63 0.57 0.62Retraining 
   > 12 months K 0.47 0.52 0.53 0.57 0.50 0.59 0.54 0.54     0.52 0.59 0.44 0.45 0.53 0.36 0.52 0.46 0.39 0.43
J 0.57 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.57 0.61 0.57 0.62     0.57 0.61 0.56 0.61 0.56 0.60 0.57 0.60Short firm-internal  
   training K 0.50 0.53 0.55 0.61 0.52 0.60 0.52 0.60 0.59 0.63     0.46 0.49 0.50 0.35 0.42 0.44 0.43 0.45
J 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.46 0.43 0.45     0.42 0.45 0.43 0.45 0.43 0.45Short classroom  
    training K 0.42 0.51 0.50 0.59 0.49 0.56 0.48 0.53 0.56 0.59 0.54 0.58     0.47 0.38 0.44 0.44 0.38 0.40
J 0.38 0.32 0.37 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.39 0.33 0.35 0.37 0.35 0.33 0.34 0.32     0.34 0.31 0.34 0.31Job creation  
   4-6 months K 0.43 0.41 0.45 0.52 0.43 0.49 0.37 0.50 0.60 0.67 0.47 0.49 0.38 0.39     0.36 0.29 0.30 0.31
J 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.33 0.36 0.32 0.40 0.31 0.40 0.41 0.35 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.33 0.32     0.33 0.31Job creation  
   7-12 months K 0.38 0.44 0.42 0.42 0.38 0.48 0.47 0.34 0.55 0.64 0.44 0.51 0.36 0.34 0.37 0.32     0.29 0.28
Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. 
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Figure A.1 
Average programme effects on participants compared to waiting – cumulated days in regular employment 
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Source:  Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. Confidence band: Computed at α = 0.05. 
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Figure A.2 
Average programme effects on participants compared to waiting – share in regular employment 
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Source: Own calculations, based on the TrEffeR data. Confidence band: Computed at α = 0.05. 
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